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Phillip Swagel1 
Introduction 
The United States pulled back from a financial market meltdown and economic collapse in late 2008 and 
early 2009—but just barely.  Not until we came to the edge of catastrophe were decisive actions taken 
to address problems that had been building in financial markets for years.  By then it was too late to 
avert a severe recession accompanied by massive job losses, skyrocketing unemployment, lower wages, 
and a growing number of American families at risk of foreclosure and poverty.   
 
This paper quantifies the economic and budgetary costs resulting from the acute stage of the financial 
crisis reached in September 2008.  This is important on its own, but it can be seen as well as giving a 
rough indication of the potential value of reforms that would help avoid a future crisis.  
 
On a budgetary level, the cost of the stage of the crisis reached in mid-September 2008 is the net cost to 
taxpayers of the policies used to stem the crisis.  This includes the programs undertaken as part of the  
Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), as well as steps taken by the Federal Reserve and the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to guarantee bank liabilities.  Actions to support Bear Stearns and 
the two government-sponsored entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were taken before the worst part 
of the crisis, but their costs continued past September and are considered by many to be part of the 
fiscal costs of the crisis. 
 
The costs of the crisis to society, however, go beyond the direct fiscal impacts to include the effect on 
incomes, wages, and job creation for the U.S. economy as a whole. The crisis reduced U.S. economic 
growth and caused a weaker job market and other undesirable outcomes.  A key challenge in 
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quantifying such a macroeconomic view of the costs of the financial crisis is to identify the particular 
effects of the crisis and to separate those impacts from other developments. 
 
The broadest perspective would look at the overall changes in the economy from the start of the crisis 
to the end, and perhaps even include an estimate of the long-run future impacts.  Implicit in such a 
calculation would be a decision to include both the effects of the crisis itself and any offsetting impacts 
from policy responses such as easier monetary policy or fiscal stimulus.  A broad accounting of the costs 
of the crisis could also include the decline in government revenues resulting from the crisis, enactment 
of policies such as the 2008 and 2009 stimulus packages, as well as the impacts of regulatory changes 
that came about in the wake of the crisis.  Under such a view, the financial crisis had large and long-
lasting impacts on the U.S. economy.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), for example, estimates that the financial crisis will lead to a 2.4 percent reduction in long-term 
U.S. GDP, anticipating that both the reduction in employment and the increased cost of capital resulting 
from the crisis will last far into the future.2 
 
The approach taken in this paper is narrower:  to distinguish and quantify costs incurred so far that are 
directly related to the crisis and, in particular, to focus on the impact of events from the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in the middle of September 2008 through the end of 2009.  This is the period in which 
the grinding slowdown associated with the credit disruption that began in August 2007 turned into a 
sharp downturn.  This approach produces smaller estimates for the cost of the crisis than the broad 
view, because the calculations quantify the costs of the acute phase of the crisis between September 
2008 and the end of 2009, and not the overall impact of events both preceding and following that time 
period.  Both approaches are valuable, and this paper is best seen as a complement to the literature on 
the overall cost of financial crises.  This distinction is revisited in the conclusion. 
 
The results in this paper complement economic research by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) that assesses 
the broad overall costs of banking crises across countries.3  Reinhart and Rogoff find that deep economic 
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downturns “invariably” follow in the wake of crises; they quantify the average impact across countries 
on output, asset prices, the labor market, and government finances.  Their results are also discussed 
below. 
 
The cost of the crisis as measured here includes both the fiscal cost and the effects on economic 
measures such as output, employment, wages, and wealth.   The difficulty in quantifying these economic 
impacts is to isolate the effects of the most acute stage of the crisis—the severe downturn in consumer 
and business spending that took place following the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.  The 
U.S. economy was already moving sideways in the first half of 2008 and most forecasters expected slow 
growth to continue for the balance of the year and into 2009.  But the events of the fall and the plunge 
in economic activity that resulted were unexpected.   
 
This paper isolates the impact of the acute phase of the crisis by comparing the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) economic forecast made in September 2008, just before the crisis, with actual outcomes.   
The approach is to compute the difference between the decline in GDP in late 2008 and 2009 and the 
forecast published by CBO in its “Budget and Economic Outlook:  An Update,” published on September 
9, 2008—the Tuesday before Lehman filed for bankruptcy on Monday, September 15.  The difference 
between actual GDP in the five quarters from October 2008 to December 2009 and the CBO forecast 
made just on the cusp of the crisis is taken as the unexpected impact of the crisis on GDP.  This GDP 
impact is then used to calculate the impact of the crisis on other measures, including jobs, wages, and 
the number of foreclosures.  The accuracy of CBO economic forecasts is similar to that of the Blue Chip 
consensus.4 
 
While this approach works to isolate the impacts of events from September 2008 forward, it is 
necessarily imprecise because it is impossible to know a) how accurate the CBO forecast would have 
been absent the crisis; b) whether the relationships between growth and other economic variables such 
as employment changed during the crisis; and c) the impact of other events from September 2008 
forward that are not related to the crisis.  Moreover, the calculations in the paper start with the fourth 
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quarter of 2008 and thus do not attribute to the crisis any output or jobs that were lost in the two weeks 
of September immediately following the collapse of Lehman Brothers (these are still counted and 
appear in the charts below, but not as part of the cost of the post-Lehman crisis).  The results in the 
paper should thus be taken as providing a rough approximation of the impact of the crisis.  This is hugely 
meaningful, however, with American families suffering thousands of dollars of losses in incomes and 
wages and enormous declines in the value of their assets, including both financial assets, such as stock 
holdings, and real estate properties, such as family homes.  These losses run into the trillions of dollars 
and on average come to a decline of nearly $66,000 per household in the value of stock holdings and a 
loss of more than $30,000 per household in the value of real estate wealth (though the inequality in 
wealth holdings means that the losses will vary considerably across families).  These impacts on 
incomes, jobs, and wealth are all very real effects of the crisis. 
 
Finally, the paper looks briefly at broader impacts on society, notably the effect of the crisis in boosting 
foreclosures and potential impacts on human factors such as poverty. 
 
Direct costs to taxpayers of financial interventions 
 
A host of government interventions were aimed at stabilizing banks and other financial sector firms, 
ranging from loans from the Federal Reserve to the outright injection of public capital into banks 
through the Treasury’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP). The direct budgetary cost of the crisis is 
taken to equal the expected net losses of these programs.  The fiscal impact of the crisis considered here 
does not include the lower revenues and increased government spending that followed the crisis.  
Instead, the focus is on the costs of interventions undertaken in direct response to the acute phase of 
the crisis that began in September 2008, notably the cost of the TARP and related programs to 
guarantee bank liabilities put into effect by the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC).  These costs are tallied in Tables 1 and 2, below.  These cost estimates are from the 
January 2010 CBO estimate of TARP commitments and expected losses, and the February 2010 estimate 
by the Congressional Oversight Panel of the Fed’s commitment to several programs run jointly by the 
Treasury and the Fed (the table provides references to the sources).  The TARP authority was part of the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA) enacted on October 3, 2008; this was used by the 
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Treasury Department for a variety of purposes, including capital injections into banks, guarantees for 
assets of certain banks, foreclosure relief, support for the AIG insurance company, and subsidies to 
prevent foreclosures. 
 
CBO estimates that $500 billion of the $700 billion capacity of the TARP will end up being used or 
committed, with programs now in existence having a $73 billion net cost to taxpayers.  As shown in 
Table 1, the TARP was used to support a range of activities, including the purchase of stakes in banks 
under the capital purchase program (CPP); special assistance to Citigroup, Bank of America, and AIG; 
support to automotive industry firms; support for programs to boost securitization of new lending 
through the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) run jointly with the Fed; the Public-Private 
Investment Partnerships (PPIP) to deal with illiquid “legacy” assets such as subprime mortgage-backed 
securities; and the Home Affordable Program aimed at reducing the number of foreclosures.  TARP 
assistance to banks on the whole is projected to generate a $7 billion profit for taxpayers (even though 
some banks that received TARP funds have failed or stopped paying dividends to the Treasury).  Other 
programs, notably aid to auto firms, AIG, and homeowners at risk of foreclosure, are projected to result 
in substantial losses of TARP funds, with an overall net cost of $73 billion. As part of the Congressional 
budget process, the CBO estimates as well that there could be future uses and losses involving TARP 
resources, but they would not be directly related to the crisis of September 2008. 
 
In addition, the Federal Reserve lent $248 billion as part of TARP-related programs to support AIG and to 
foster securitization through the TALF.  These Fed loans are generally well-secured—indeed, Fed lending 
related to AIG is now over-collateralized (the TARP having replaced the Fed in the risky aspect of the AIG 
transaction)—but it is possible in principle that there could be future losses and thus further costs. 
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Table 2 also shows certain direct budgetary costs related to the crisis that commenced before 
September 2008, notably Federal Reserve lending related to the collapse of Bear Stearns in March 2008, 
and cost to the Treasury of support for the two housing-related GSEs, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.  
These are not directly the result of the September 2008 stage of the crisis, but are shown since they are 
closely related to those financial market events.   The financial rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
cost taxpayers $91 billion in fiscal year 2009 (October 2008 to September 2009), according to the 
Congressional Budget Office, and CBO forecasts a total cost to taxpayers of $157 billion through 2015 
(these figures are from Table 3-3 in the CBO January 2010 Budget and Economic Outlook).  These costs 
are related to the broader financial crisis, since the activities of the two firms underpinned parts of the 
housing market that were at the root of the crisis.  There is a sense, however, that these costs were the 
result of losses that largely predated the events of September 2008—namely losses on mortgages 
Table 1: Direct Costs of the TARP 
($ billions) 
 Distributed or 
Committed by Treasury 
Net Cost 
(profit if negative) 
Federal Reserve 
Commitment 
Total TARP 501 73 248 
CPP (Bank capital) 205 -3  
Citigroup 25 -2  
Bank of America 20 -2  
AIG 70 9 68† 
Autos 81 47  
TALF (Securitization) 20 1 180 
PPIP (Illiquid MBS) 30 3  
HAMP (Foreclosures) 50 20  
 
Sources:  Congressional Budget Office, “The Budget and Economic Outlook:  Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020,” January 2010, Box 1-2, 
pp. 12-13, and TARP Congressional Oversight Panel “February Oversight Report,” February 10, 2010, pp. 176-177.  Treasury 
commitments and costs or profits are from the Congressional Budget Office; Federal Reserve commitments as of December 31, 
2009 are from the Congressional Oversight Panel February 2010 report.  
 
†
 The $68 billion reported by the Congressional Oversight Panel represents the amount of AIG-lending extended by the Federal 
Reserve, but not the net cost of this lending. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reports that the outstanding balance of 
Federal Reserve lending related to AIG as of September 30, 2009 totaled $36.7 billion with a fair market value of $39.7 billion 
for the collateral behind the lending, implying that the lending is overcollateralized on a mark-to-market basis.  In effect, 
resources from the TARP replaced part of the initial Fed lending to AIG, leaving the TARP with losses and the Fed’s remaining 
loans over-collateralized. 
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guaranteed by the two firms, and losses on subprime mortgage-backed securities they purchased prior 
to the failure of Lehman Brothers.  While the costs grew as a result of the September 2008 crisis and the 
subsequent economic collapse, it is likely that much of the losses were built into these firms’ balance 
sheets before September 2008.  As shown in Table 2, Fed lending related to Bear Stearns involves a loss 
of $3 billion on a mark-to-market basis—this is the net of the $29 billion in non-recourse lending from 
the Fed minus the estimated value of the collateral behind those loans as of September 30, 2009 (the 
most recent date for which estimates are available). 
 
Other monetary policy actions undertaken by the Federal Reserve in the fall of 2008, such as programs 
to support commercial paper markets and money market mutual funds, are not included in this tally.  
These might well have positive budgetary impacts as the Fed collects interest and fees from users of 
these liquidity facilities.  Similarly, the stimulus packages enacted in early 2008 and early 2009 were 
both arguably brought about because of the impact of the financial crisis on the economy, but these did 
not directly address financial sector issues and are not included here. 
 
Table 2: Other Financial Commitments Related to the Crisis 
($ billions) 
Agency Type of Commitment or Assets Purchased Amount guaranteed or 
purchased 
FDIC TLGP (guarantees for bank debt) 577 
   
Federal Reserve GSE debt purchases 175 
 Mortgage-backed securities purchases 1,250 
 Treasury securities purchases 300 
 Bear Stearns-related lending 29† 
   
Treasury GSEs – Support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 157 
Sources: FDIC: TARP Congressional Oversight Panel “February Oversight Report,” February 10, 2010, pp. 176-177.   FDIC 
Temporary Loan Guarantee Program is the amount of senior bank debt covered by FDIC guarantees.  Federal Reserve purchases 
are from www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy.  These figures are total (gross) amounts of liabilities guaranteed by the FDIC 
and assets purchased by the Federal Reserve; they do not provide the net cost or gain to taxpayers.  The FDIC and Federal 
Reserve programs are all likely to make positive returns.  Treasury costs for GSEs are from Congressional Budget Office, “The 
Budget and Economic Outlook:  Fiscal Years 2010 to 2020,” January 2010, Box 3-3, p. 52. 
 
†
 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York reports a fair market value of $26.1 billion for the collateral behind the $29.2 billion 
loan balance related to Bear Stearns as of September 30, 2009, implying a $3 billion loss on a mark-to-market basis. 
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In sum, the direct budget costs from efforts to stabilize the financial system following the events of mid-
September 2008 are meaningful—with net costs of $73 billion and hundreds of billions of public dollars 
deployed or otherwise put at risk of loss.  These figures, however, are only a modest part of the cost of 
the financial crisis.  The larger impacts are those that affected the private sector as a result of the 
significant decline in economic activity that followed the crisis.  These are tallied by calculating the 
impact of the September 2008 financial crisis on output, employment, wages, and wealth. 
 
Economic costs: Lost wages, incomes, jobs, and wealth 
 
The U.S. economy was already slowing in the first half of 2008, as the slide in housing prices that began 
in 2006 and the tightening of credit markets from 2007 both weighed on growth.  High oil prices added 
another headwind in 2008.  The economy entered a recession in December 2007; while this was not yet 
announced when the crisis became acute in mid-September 2008, it was clear that growth would 
remain subdued even under the best of circumstances while the U.S. economy worked through the 
challenges of housing, credit, and energy markets.  Even so, the financial crisis in September 2008 clearly 
exacerbated the pre-existing economic slowdown, turning a mild downturn into a deep recession.  In 
effect, the events of September and October 2008 were a severe negative shock to American confidence 
in the economy, and in the ability of our government and our political system to deal with the crisis.  All 
at once, families and businesses across the United States looked at the crisis and stopped spending—
even those who had not yet been directly affected by the mounting credit disruption that started in 
August 2007 put a hold on their plans.  Families stopped spending, while firms stopped hiring and 
paused investment projects.  As a result, the economy plunged, with GDP falling by 5.4 percent and 6.4 
percent (at annual rates) in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009—the worst six months 
for economic growth since 1958. 
 
Assessing the economic costs associated with the acute phase of the crisis in September 2008 requires 
separating the impacts of the events of fall 2008 from the pre-existing economic weakness.  While this is 
not possible to do with precision, one practical approach is to take as a baseline the GDP growth 
forecast published by the CBO on September 9, 2008—just before the crisis.  The difference between 
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actual GDP, and the CBO forecast for GDP in the balance of 2008 and over all of 2009, is then taken to 
reflect the “surprise” impact of the crisis.  This is an imperfect measure since there is no reason to 
expect the CBO forecast to have been completely accurate had it not been for subsequent events such 
as the collapse of Lehman. 
 
With these caveats in mind, the September 2008 CBO forecast remains plausible as a guide for what 
would have happened absent the financial crisis of September 2008.  The CBO forecast 1.5 percent real 
GDP growth in 2008 as a whole, followed by 1.1 percent growth in 2009.  With the first half of the year 
already recorded, 1.5 percent growth for the year as a whole implies that CBO expected GDP to decline 
at a 0.25 percent annual rate in the second half of 2008.5  That is, CBO expected growth to be weak and 
even slightly negative in the latter part of 2008 but then pick up in 2009—indeed, the CBO forecast 
implies quite strong growth by the end of 2009. 
 
Figure 1 plots actual real GDP against GDP as implied by the CBO forecast from September 2008 and the 
CBO’s calculation of potential GDP—the level of GDP that would be consistent with full utilization of 
resources.6  As shown on the chart, GDP plunged at the end of 2008 and into early 2009, falling by 5.4 
percent and 6.4 percent in the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, against CBO 
expectations of a nearly flat profile for output over this period.  The difference between the CBO 
forecast and the actual outcome for GDP comes to a total of $648 billion in 2009 dollars for the five 
quarters from the beginning of October 2008 to the end of December 2009, equal to an average of 
$5,800 in lost income for each of the roughly 111 million U.S. households. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 GDP data for 2008 have been revised since the CBO forecast was made; the implied negative GDP growth of 0.25 
percent at an annual rate is computed using the GDP data that were available to the CBO in September 2008. 
6
 The CBO forecast uses the growth rates in the September 2008 CBO forecast, adjusting the past levels of GDP for 
subsequent revisions to GDP data that were known prior to September 2008. 
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Figure 1:  Impact of the Crisis on Economy-wide Output 
  
 
Note: GDP as plotted in the chart is in billions of 2005 (real) dollars at a seasonally adjusted annual rate. The dollar figures in the 
boxes, however, are translated into 2009 dollars. 
 
The hit to GDP was matched as well across the economy, with declines in jobs, wages, and wealth.  The 
next step is to translate the unexpected GDP decline into an impact on the labor market.  To calculate 
the impact on employment, a statistical relationship is estimated between percent job growth in a 
quarter and real GDP growth over the past year.  The four-quarter change in output is used to capture 
the fact that the job market is typically a lagging indicator, responding after some delay to an improving 
or slowing overall economy.  The relationship is estimated as a linear regression for quarterly data from 
2000 to 2007, capturing a complete business cycle.  This regression provides an empirical relationship 
between GDP growth and job growth—an analogue of what economists term “Okun’s Law.” The 
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estimated regression is not a structural model, but an empirical relationship that can be used to back 
out employment under different GDP growth scenarios. The GDP figures corresponding to the CBO 
forecast are then used to simulate the level of employment that would have occurred with the CBO 
forecast made before the September 2008 crisis. 
 
Figure 2 shows the impact of the acute stage of the crisis on employment:  5.5 million jobs were lost in 
the five quarters through the end of 2009 as a result of slower GDP growth compared to what would 
have been the case under the CBO forecast made in September 2008.  Slow growth in the first three 
quarters of 2008 had left employment 1.8 million jobs lower than potential, and the CBO forecast for 
continued weak growth in the rest of 2008 and 2009 would have meant job losses until the last quarter 
of 2009, but at a much more moderate pace than actually occurred.  Under the CBO forecast, 
employment by the end of 2009 would have been 4.0 million lower than with growth at potential, but 
the additional negative shock to GDP from the crisis knocked off another 5.5 million jobs, leaving 
employment at the end of 2009 9.5 million jobs lower than the potential of the U.S. economy. 
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Figure 2:  Impact of the Crisis on Employment 
 
 
Note: Employment in thousands. 
 
Figure 3 shows that the GDP hit and job losses correspond to lost wages for American families—a total 
of $360 billion of lost wages in the five quarters from October 2008 through December 2009 as a result 
of slower growth following September 2008.  This equals $3,250 on average per U.S. household.  Wage 
losses are calculated by taking actual wages with the lower growth and adding back both the wages for 
the jobs that would have existed with stronger growth and the increased wages per job for all jobs had 
growth not plunged in the fall and dragged down average wages.  The additional wage growth per job is 
calculated using the trend wage growth before the crisis. 
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Figure 3:  Impact of the Crisis on Wages 
 
 
Note: Wages in billions of 2009 dollars. 
 
The value of families’ real estate holdings declined sharply over the crisis as well, with a loss of $5.9 
trillion from mid-2007 to March 2009, or a loss of $3.4 trillion from mid-2008 to March 2009.  These 
correspond to wealth losses of more than $52,900 per household in the longer period, or $30,300 per 
household for the shorter one.  The modest rebound in the housing market in the latter part of 2009 has 
meant that the wealth loss from mid-2008 through the end of 2009 is $1.6 trillion, or $14,200 per 
household.   Unlike the economic variables of output, employment, and wages, the wealth measures are 
not adjusted for the unexpected impact of the events of September 2008.  This is because market-based 
measures of asset values in principle should already reflect the expectation of slower growth from the 
perspective of mid-2008.  The unexpected plunge in the economy in late 2008 and into 2009 would not 
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be reflected in asset values, however, making these valid measures of the impact of the acute stage of 
the crisis on household wealth.  
 
Figure 4 shows that the financial crisis exacted an immense toll on household wealth.  The value of 
families’ equity holdings fell by $10.9 trillion from the middle of 2007 to the end of March 2009—the 
longest period of decline in the value of stock holdings.  This equals a loss of $97,000 per household.  
Looking at the decline in the value of stock holdings only from the middle of 2008 to the end of March 
2009 gives a loss of $7.4 trillion, or about $66,200 per household. The measure of stock market wealth 
includes both stocks owned directly by families and indirectly through ownership of shares of mutual 
funds.  Data on wealth holdings are from the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds database and are available 
quarterly.  The wealth declines are thus measured starting from the end of June 2008 since the next 
quarterly value is for the end of September of that year and thus after the acute stage of the crisis had 
already begun.  Stocks have rebounded over 2009, with the value of household equity holdings at the 
end of the year back to the same level as at the end of June 2008. 
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Figure 4:  Impact of the Crisis on Household Wealth 
 
 
Note: in billions of dollars. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the economic impacts of the acute stage of the crisis that began in September 2008.  
By all measures, the acute phase of the financial crisis had a severe impact on the U.S. economy, with 
massive losses of incomes, jobs, wages, and wealth. 
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The Human Dimension of the Crisis 
 
Beyond dollars and cents, the financial crisis had substantial negative impacts on American families both 
at present and, likely, for decades to come as the hardships faced by children translate into changed 
lives into the future.  The poverty rate, for example, increased from 9.8 percent in 2007 to 10.3 percent 
in 2008, meaning that an additional 395,000 families fell into poverty.  There is not a simple relationship 
between economic growth and poverty, and poverty data are not yet available for 2009, but the weaker 
growth that resulted following the events of September 2008 surely sent thousands of additional 
families into poverty.  And the crisis will have attendant consequences for other economic outcomes 
including the future prospects for employment and wage growth of those facing long spells of 
unemployment. 
 
While it is not possible to count all of the ways in which the crisis affects the United States, a glimpse of 
the human cost of the crisis can be seen in the number of additional foreclosures started as a result of 
the severe economic downturn that began in September 2008.  Millions of foreclosures were already 
likely even before the acute part of the crisis—the legacy of the housing bubble of these years was that 
too many American families got into homes that they did not have the financial wherewithal to afford.  
For other families, however, a lost job as a result of the severe recession translated into a foreclosure, 
and this can be estimated using a similar methodology as for the economic variables above. 
 
 
Table 3:  Economic and Fiscal Impacts of the Crisis 
 
 Total impact of the 
crisis 
Per Household Loss 
GDP (total lost income) $650 billion $5,800 
Employment (lost jobs) 5.5 million jobs  
Wages (total lost wages) $360 billion $3,250 
Real estate wealth (July 08-March 09) $3.4 trillion $30,300 
Stock wealth (July 08-March 09) $7.4 trillion $66,200 
Fiscal cost (losses on TARP + GSEs) $230 billion $2,050 
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Figure 5:  Impact of the Crisis on Foreclosure Starts 
 
 
 
With the economy projected to remain weak in the second half of 2008 and into early 2009, and with 
many people deeply underwater with mortgages far greater than the value of their homes, there would 
still have been millions of foreclosure proceedings started.  But the weaker economy following the acute 
phase of the crisis worsened the problem, layering the impact of an even weaker economy on top of the 
already difficult situations faced by many American families on the downside of the housing bubble. 
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Conclusion 
 
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 has had a massive impact on the United States.  Millions of American 
families suffered losses of jobs, incomes, and homes—and the effects of these losses will play out on 
society for generations to come.  This paper quantifies some of these impacts, focusing on the aftermath 
of September 2008 and attempting to isolate the effects of the crisis from other developments.  The 
result was hundreds of billions of dollars of lost output and lower wages, millions of lost jobs, trillions of 
dollars of lost wealth, and hundreds of thousands of additional foreclosures. 
 
An alternative perspective would be to look at the overall impacts of the crisis from start to finish.  This 
would be a broad view but a less well defined calculation:  one could calculate economic impacts, for 
example, from the start of the housing bubble or from its peak.  Or one could seek to exclude the 
offsetting impact of monetary and fiscal policy measures taken in response to the crisis and attempt to 
isolate the impact of the crisis alone.    
 
These are different (and difficult) calculations to make, but some evidence can be garnered on the 
broader impacts of the crisis from start to finish.  The International Monetary Fund, for example, 
estimates that U.S. banks will take total writedowns of just over $1 trillion on loans and asset losses 
from 2007 to 2010, including $654 billion of losses on loans and $371 billion of losses on securitized 
assets such as mortgage-backed securities. 
 
The policy response to the crisis has involved massive fiscal costs, with U.S. public debt up substantially 
due to lower revenues and higher spending in response to the crisis, and this increase is forecast to 
continue under current law over the years to come.  The declines in output and asset values and 
increases in U.S. public debt mirror the experience of other countries.  As discussed by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2009), banking crises across countries lead to an average decline in output of 9 percent, a 7 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, 50 percent decline in equity prices, 35 percent 
drop in real home prices, and an average 86 percent increase in public debt. 
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Figure 1 of this analysis provides evidence connecting the results of this paper to this broader literature.  
One measure of the overall economic impact of the crisis is the output gap between actual and potential 
GDP.  In 2008 and 2009 combined, this gap comes to $1.2 trillion, or $10,500 per household.  This is a 
loss of nearly 5 percent of potential GDP in total over the two years—less than the 9 percent average 
loss across countries found by Reinhart and Rogoff, but the costs of the crisis calculated in this paper 
cover only part of the crisis and only through the end of 2009.  As shown in Figure 1, GDP looks to 
remain below potential for years into the future, implying higher overall costs of the crisis. 
 
The financial crisis of the past several years has had a massive economic cost for the United States—
trillions of dollars of wealth and output foregone, millions of jobs lost, and many hundreds of thousands 
of families suffering hardship.  These costs demonstrate the importance of taking steps to avoid future 
crises, and the value of reforms that help achieve this goal. 
 
 
